A Microsoft 365 tenant ships with a lot of security switches turned off by default. Microsoft's own secure-by-default push has closed some gaps, but plenty remain — and the defaults rarely match what a security-conscious MSP would actually recommend. This checklist walks through 50+ concrete M365 and Entra ID controls worth verifying on any tenant audit, grouped so you can work through them methodically rather than clicking around the admin center hoping you didn't miss anything.
Treat this as a working reference. Every item below is something you can check in the Microsoft 365 admin center, the Entra admin center, the Defender portal, or via PowerShell/Graph.
Identity and Authentication (Entra ID)
Identity is where most real-world compromise starts, so it gets the most attention.
- Multi-factor authentication is enforced for all users (not just admins).
- Security defaults are either enabled, or intentionally replaced by Conditional Access.
- Legacy authentication protocols (POP, IMAP, SMTP AUTH, basic auth) are blocked.
- Conditional Access policies require MFA for admin roles specifically.
- A Conditional Access policy blocks or restricts sign-ins from unexpected countries.
- Risky sign-in and risky user policies are configured (where licensing allows).
- Self-service password reset is enabled and requires strong verification.
- Password expiration is set to not-expire in favor of strong-password + MFA guidance.
- Banned password list / password protection is configured.
- Guest (B2B) access is restricted and reviewed.
- The number of Global Administrators is minimized — ideally fewer than five.
- At least two, but not too many, break-glass emergency access accounts exist and are excluded from CA policies that could lock everyone out.
- Privileged Identity Management (PIM) provides just-in-time elevation for admin roles (where licensed).
- Administrators use separate cloud-only admin accounts, not their daily mailbox accounts.
- User consent to apps is restricted so non-admins can't grant broad permissions.
- Admin consent workflow is enabled for app requests.
- Stale guest and disabled accounts are reviewed and removed.
Email and Collaboration (Exchange Online & Defender)
Email remains the primary delivery vector for phishing and business email compromise.
- SPF is published and configured correctly for all sending domains.
- DKIM is enabled for each custom domain.
- DMARC is published, ideally moving toward a
rejectorquarantinepolicy rather thannone. - External email receives a clear safety/warning indicator.
- Anti-phishing policies include impersonation and spoof protection.
- Safe Links and Safe Attachments are enabled (Defender for Office 365 plans).
- Auto-forwarding of mail to external addresses is blocked or tightly controlled.
- Mailbox auditing is enabled across the tenant.
- Mail flow rules are reviewed for suspicious or overly permissive forwarding.
- Common risky attachment types are filtered or blocked.
- Zero-hour auto purge (ZAP) is enabled for malware and phishing.
Data Protection and Sharing (SharePoint, OneDrive, Teams)
- External sharing defaults are set to the least-permissive level the business can tolerate.
- Anonymous "anyone" sharing links are disabled or time-limited.
- Default sharing link type is set to specific people rather than organization-wide.
- Sensitivity labels are published and applied where appropriate.
- Data Loss Prevention (DLP) policies cover financial, PII, and health data as relevant.
- Retention policies exist for mail, SharePoint, and Teams.
- Guest access in Teams is governed by a reviewed policy.
- OneDrive sync is restricted to managed or compliant devices where feasible.
- Unmanaged device access to SharePoint/OneDrive is limited or blocked.
Device and Endpoint (Intune / Defender for Endpoint)
- Device compliance policies exist and are enforced via Conditional Access.
- Managed devices require encryption (BitLocker / FileVault).
- Mobile Application Management or MDM protects corporate data on mobile.
- Defender for Endpoint (or an equivalent EDR) is deployed where licensed.
- Local administrator rights on endpoints are minimized.
- Attack surface reduction rules are configured (where applicable).
Logging, Monitoring, and Response
- The Unified Audit Log is turned on (it must be explicitly enabled on some tenants).
- Sign-in and audit logs are retained long enough for investigations.
- Alerts exist for risky events — admin role changes, mass downloads, forwarding rule creation.
- Logs are exported to a SIEM or long-term store where the client requires it.
- Secure Score is reviewed and tracked over time, not just checked once.
- A documented incident response contact and process exists for the tenant.
Governance and Lifecycle
- Admin roles are reviewed on a recurring schedule (access reviews where licensed).
- A joiner-mover-leaver process ensures accounts are deprovisioned promptly.
- Licensing is matched to the security features the client actually needs — several controls above require specific plans.
- Tenant-wide settings (self-service group creation, app registration by users) are reviewed.
- Backup of M365 data is addressed — Microsoft's retention is not a backup.
How to Act
Fifty-plus controls is a lot to walk through by hand, tenant by tenant, and it's easy to skip something under a deadline — or to check it once and never again as the tenant drifts. Working through this list methodically, in order, for every new engagement is the baseline; the harder discipline is doing it on a recurring schedule, because most of these settings can quietly revert or get excluded without anyone noticing.
Run an audit to check a tenant against this checklist and the frameworks it draws from (CIS, CISA SCuBA) automatically, in minutes instead of an afternoon.